Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Eliminative reasoning seems to play an important role in the sciences, but should it be part of our best theory of science? Statistical evidence, prevalent across the sciences, causes problems for eliminative inference, supporting the view that probabilistic theories of confirmation provide a better framework for reasoning about evidence. Here I argue that deductive elimination has an important inferential role to play in science, one that is compatible with probabilistic approaches to evidence. Eliminative inferences help frame testing problems, an essential step that determines the context for evaluating statistical evidence. I illustrate this process with examples from molecular evolutionary biology.
Thanks to Peter Godfrey-Smith, Mark Richard, Elliott Sober, and Kyle Stanford for extensive comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to audiences at the University of California, Irvine, Logic and Philosophy of Science Department and the Colorado State University Philosophy Department for useful feedback and to the anonymous referees for valuable criticism.