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The Real Virtue of Friedman's Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Buket Korkut
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Abstract

Michael Friedman has recently developed a neo-Kantian conception of science as a rival to holistic accounts. According to Friedman, the main virtue of his neo-Kantian philosophy is that it resolves the problem of incommensurability. A close reading of Friedman's work, however, indicates that his account surprisingly accomplishes the opposite of what he believes to have defended. This article will argue that the real virtue of Friedman's neo-Kantian account of scientific theories is not that it resolves the problem of incommensurability but that it provides an elegant philosophical account much needed to substantiate Thomas Kuhn's historical thesis of incommensurability.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 1 , January 2011 , pp. 1 - 15
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

My gratitude goes to Don Howard for his positive comments on the earliest version of this article and to the participants of the History and Philosophy of Science discussion group at the University of Notre Dame for their feedback on a presentation of my main argument. I am particularly grateful to David Solomon, Elijah Millgram, James Barham, Karl Ameriks, Matthew Capdevielle, and Robert Nola for their valuable comments on this article. I would also like to thank the reviewers and editors of Philosophy of Science for their kind assistance.

References

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