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The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part II: An Aim Oriented Theory of Scientific Discovery

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Nicholas Maxwell*
Affiliation:
University of London

Abstract

In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No. 2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that it is possible for pure science to be rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific discovery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this theory (a) exhibits pure science as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implications both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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