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Random Drift and the Omniscient Viewpoint

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Roberta L. Millstein
Roberta L. Millstein*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Abstract

Alexander Rosenberg (1994) claims that the omniscient viewpoint of the evolutionary process would have no need for the concept of random drift. However, his argument fails to take into account all of the processes which are considered to be instances of random drift. A consideration of these processes shows that random drift is not eliminable even given a position of omniscience. Furthermore, Rosenberg must take these processes into account in order to support his claims that evolution is deterministic and that evolutionary biology is an instrumental science.

Type
Philosophy of Biology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996 , pp. S10 - S18
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to John Beatty, Carl Chung, Ron Giere, Kevin Lattery, Ken Waters and Chris Young for helpful discussion. This work was partially supported by a University of Minnesota Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship.

‡

Department of Philosophy, 355 Ford Hall, University of Minnesota, 224 Church St. S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455.

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