Article contents
Abstract
What are the relative epistemic merits of building prosthetic models versus building nonprosthetic models and simulations? I argue that prosthetic models provide a sufficient test of affordance validity, that is, of whether the target system affords mechanisms that can be commandeered by a prosthesis. In other respects, prosthetic models are epistemically on par with nonprosthetic models. I focus on prosthetics in neuroscience, but the results are general. The goal of understanding how brain mechanisms work under ecologically and physiologically relevant conditions is narrow compared to the search for maker's knowledge about how the brain can be made to work for us.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
Thanks to Anna Alexandrova, Masviita Chirimuuta, Dennis Des Chene, David Kaplan, Dan Moran, Wendy Parker, Susan Sterrett, and the members of the Washington University Philosophy of Science Co-op for comments and discussion.
References
- 12
- Cited by