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The Process of Discovery

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Andrew Lugg
Andrew Lugg*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa
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Abstract

The main argument of this paper is that philosophical difficulties regarding scientific discovery arise mainly because philosophers base their arguments on a flawed picture of scientific research. Careful examination of N. R. Hanson's treatment of Kepler's discovery not only puts the rationality of this discovery beyond question, it also reveals what its rationality consists in. We can retrieve the point stressed by Hanson concerning the rational character of discoveries such as Kepler's even as we reject the type of “logical” analysis he proposes.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , June 1985 , pp. 207 - 220
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

In writing this paper I have benefited from the comments of Lynne Cohen, Howard Duncan, and Thomas Nickles.

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