No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Pragmatism and the Ideal Language
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Abstract
Pursuing a line of progression articulated by Prof. Quine, Dr. Pasch (Experience and the Analytic) argues that the analytic-synthetic distinction rests on mere convention. Further, that the use of this distinction by present day empiricists—especially the rational reconstructionists—has caused empiricism to take a departure from traditional empiricism. I observe, in opposition, 1) the natural language firmament is itself an amorphous construct, 2) the natural language might be the language of experience but not of empiricism, 3) the ideal language is tied to experience by primitives for what perceptually appears, and 4) if one claims the primitives must be tested in scientific inquiry, a case should be made for this philosophical position.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1959 by Philosophy of Science Association
References
1 Alan Pasch, Experience and the Analytic, University of Chicago Press, 1958.
2 Ibid., p. 47.
3 W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review v. 60, reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, Harvard U. P., 1953.
4 This observation applies to descriptive words and to logical ones. Indirectly, then, even syntax is affected. One might more accurately say that with the contextual fundament, allowed here and insisted upon by the Oxford school of analysis, different and distinguishable syntactical frameworks can be seen.
5 If there is no single language which can with good reason be called the natural language, then we should not be astonished at the claim that only in an artificial language can we make the analytic-synthetic distinction. Further, this is to say nothing against the usefulness of the distinction.
6 I allow habit and use in the construction of a natural language, but not random collecting of elements. For, a language would need (a) names and characterizing terms, and (b) formation rules. In so-called natural languages formation rules appear as habits. The admission, on the other hand, of (a) above is prima facie justification of an ideal language; but more on this later.
Pasch admits that there are sets of natural languages. But then he should claim that the language of experience is the natural language, where ‘natural language’ is to cover the whole class. This is a subtle distinction, but one he must make, thereby leaving himself a language for empiricism which is not a language of context. That he has such a language is clear from his criticism of the distinction between logical and nonlogical words.
7 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
8 Who has not heard ‘and’ used as even a compressed challenge. In reply to a charge one hears, simply “And.” Analysis can never forget the element of truth in the claim of Humpty Dumpty, however small this truth.
9 When a philosopher says the meaning of a term is such-and-such, (1) he is claiming that there is one sense which is its core or minimal meaning. Or, (2) he would single out one sense for its importance in a philosophical pattern he is developing. In either case he must defend his choice.
10 Even allowing there is a sense in which ‘but’ indicates surprise, this is a different use of language. Because of this, ‘but’ is used descriptively in a sense of that term different from the sense in which ‘green’ is descriptive.
11 Pasch writes, “In fact, Bergmann, whom I shall select as representative of recent practitioners and defenders of the faith in question—not because he is typical of rational reconstructionists (in many respects he carries rational reconstruction to far greater lengths than any of his colleagues) but because his methodological excesses, besides having great heuristic value, seem to me to coincide most closely with the actual philosophic pronouncements of most reconstructionists.” (pp. 62-63).
12 Ibid., p. 76.
13 Passages here quoted are taken sequentially from pp. 77-81.
14 That Bergmann has this most clearly in mind can be found in many places and should be well known. One clear assertion appears in “Two Types of Linguistic Philosophy,” Rev. of Metaphysics, v. 5, in which he writes, “it is no more a language that can be spoken than the sketch or even the blueprint of a house can be lived in.” The above statement neglects, safely for the purposes at hand, Bergmann's later additions to PM in order to accomodate his analysis of mind.
15 Gustav Bergmann, “The Revolt Against Logical Atomism,” The Philosophical Quarterly, v. 7, p. 7.