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The Pitfalls of Microphysical Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

Microphysical realism is the position that the only real entities and properties are found at the most fundamental level of nature. In this article, I challenge microphysical realism concerning properties and natural kinds. One argument for microphysical realism about entities, the “nothing-but argument,” does not apply to properties and kinds. Another argument, the “causal exclusion argument,” cannot be sustained in light of modern physics. Moreover, this argument leads to an objection against microphysical realism, based on the “illusoriness of macroproperties.” Another objection is based on the possibility that there is no fundamental level but a “bottomless pit.”

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

I am grateful to an audience at the Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Meeting in Montreal, November 2010, for helpful comments.

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