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Philosophical Scrutiny of Evidence of Risks: From Bioethics to Bioevidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Deborah G. Mayo  and
Aris Spanos
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Abstract

We argue that a responsible analysis of today's evidence-based risk assessments and risk debates in biology demands a critical or metascientific scrutiny of the uncertainties, assumptions, and threats of error along the manifold steps in risk analysis. Without an accompanying methodological critique, neither sensitivity to social and ethical values, nor conceptual clarification alone, suffices. In this view, restricting the invitation for philosophical involvement to those wearing a “bioethicist” label precludes the vitally important role philosophers of science may be able to play as bioevidentialists. The goal of this paper is to give a brief and partial sketch of how a metascientific scrutiny of risk evidence might work.

Type
Can Philosophy Offer Help in Resolving Contemporary Biological Controversies?
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 803 - 816
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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