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Peirce, Levi, and the Aims of Inquiry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Cheryl Misak
Cheryl Misak*
Affiliation:
Balliol College, University of Oxford
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Abstract

Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own “epistemological infallibilism“. I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , June 1987 , pp. 256 - 265
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Isaac Levi for many helpful and critical discussions. L. Jonathan Cohen, Michael Kubara, Susan Haack, Christopher Hookway, and Don Roberts also commented on earlier drafts.

References

REFERENCES

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