Article contents
The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo's Use of Experiments
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
Starting with a discussion of what I call ‘Koyré's paradox of conceptual novelty’, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo's work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileo's conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo's use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo's pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileo's experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.
- Type
- Observation and Experiment
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 864 - 875
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
The author is Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research—Flanders.
References
- 3
- Cited by