Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-lj6df Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-08T15:30:00.926Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

On the D-N Model of Scientific Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

I. A. Omer
I. A. Omer*
Affiliation:
University College, Cambridge University†
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper discusses the D-N model of scientific explanation. It is suggested that explanation is a part of assertive discourse where certain principles must be observed. Then use is made of the relation between the informative content and logical content of a sentence (as shown, for instance, by Popper) to draw some of the conditions necessary for a sound model. It is claimed that the conditions of the model proposed in the present paper exhaust the insights of the papers in the literature, solve the difficulties encountered by other authors, but have some damaging consequences on the D-N model of scientific explanation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 3 , September 1970 , pp. 417 - 433
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

An earlier version of this paper has been read to the History and Philosophy of Science Seminar at the University of Cambridge. I am indebted to Professor R. B. Braithwaite, Professor E. McMullin, Dr. M. B. Hesse, Mr. G. M. K. Hunt, Mr. L. Gibson and Mr. A. J. Matthew for critical discussions. My especial indebtedness is to Dr. D. H. Mellor for helpful critical discussions and valuable suggestions while writing this paper.

When writing this paper the author held a British Council Scholarship.

References

REFERENCES

[1] Ackermann, R., “Deductive Scientific Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 32, 1965, pp. 155–167.10.1086/288036CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Ackermann, R. and Stenner, A., “A Corrected Model of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 33, 1966, pp. 168–171.10.1086/288087CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Braithwaite, R. B., Scientific Explanation, Cambridge University Press, 1953.Google Scholar
[4] Carnap, R., Introduction to Semantics, Harvard University Press, 1946.Google Scholar
[5] Eberle, R., Kaplan, D., and Montague, R., “Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 28, 1961, pp. 418–428.10.1086/287828CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6] Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 15, 1948, pp. 135–175.10.1086/286983CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[7] Hempel, C. G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation, The Free Press, 1965.Google Scholar
[8] Kaplan, D., “Explanation Revisited,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 28, 1961, pp. 429–436.10.1086/287829CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[9] Kim, J., “On the Logical Conditions of Deductive Explanations,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 30, 1963, pp. 286–291.10.1086/287943CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[10] Popper, K., Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.Google Scholar
[11] Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson and Co., ed. 1968.Google Scholar
[12] Quine, W. V. O., Methods of Logic, Henry Holt and Co., 1950.Google Scholar
[13] Strawson, P. F., “If and ⊃,” Off-print α19, Faculty of Moral Science, University of Cambridge.Google Scholar
[14] Törnebohm, H., “The Lorentz-formulae and the Metrical Principles,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 29, 1962, pp. 269–278.10.1086/287875CrossRefGoogle Scholar