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On the Alleged Extensionality of “Causal Explanatory Contexts”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Cindy Stern
Cindy Stern*
Affiliation:
Syracuse University
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Abstract

In a recent paper, Michael Levin argues that both statements reporting causal relations and causal explanatory statements are extensional. We show that his argument for the extensionality of causal explanatory statements fails to establish that conclusion. His claim that certain ‘because’ statements are elliptical for statements of what he terms the ‘causal explanatory’ form is unsubstantiated. The argument for the referential transparency of the allegedly explanatory form, regardless of whether it is a distinct explanatory form, fails because of scope problems. Finally, we argue that the apparent referential opacity of explanations, the attribution of certain kinds of properties to explanations, and our satisfaction with explanations in what appear to be disparate forms are best accounted for, not by the assumption of ellipticality of statements in various forms for statements in some inherently explanatory form, but rather by an account of explanation as a speech act, the success or failure of which may be affected by which of several co-referring expressions is employed.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 4 , December 1978 , pp. 614 - 625
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Professor Alexander Rosenberg, who challenged me to sharpen the details of my critical remarks and my discussion of explanation, and who offered considerable stylistic guidance. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of Professor Philip L. Peterson, whose comments at a later stage in the development of the paper led me to clarify the expression of certain points fundamental to my criticism of Levin's argument.

References

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