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On Epistemically Detrimental Dissent: Contingent Enabling Factors versus Stable Difference-Makers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Soazig Le Bihan  and
Iheanyi Amadi
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Abstract

The aim of this article is to critically build on Justin Biddle and Anna Leuschner’s characterization of epistemologically detrimental dissent (EDD) in the context of science. We argue that the presence of nonepistemic agendas and severe nonepistemic consequences offers neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for EDD to obtain. We clarify their role by arguing that they are contingent enabling factors, not stable difference-makers, in the production of EDD. We maintain that two stable difference-makers are core to the production of EDD: production of skewed science and effective public dissemination.

Type
Values in Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 5 , December 2017 , pp. 1020 - 1030
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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