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On Being Unreasonable

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Morton L. Schagrin
Morton L. Schagrin*
Affiliation:
State University College, Fredonia, N. Y.
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Abstract

The problem of the critical assessment of theories across paradigms raised by Kuhn is not resolved, it is argued, either by Scheffler's appeal to initial credibility or by Lakatos' conception of a research program. It is argued further that, in these contexts, the notion of reasonable choice by individuals makes no sense. The conclusion supports Feyerabend's position of “epistemological anarchism.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 40 , Issue 1 , March 1973 , pp. 1 - 9
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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