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Abstract
There are three centrally important ways in which norms have been elaborated and explained: in terms of religious or natural law strictures on behavior, in terms of constraints imposed by rationality, and, recently, in terms of agents' behavior in well-defined games. The principal difficulty of a gaming account of norms is to show how the account explains motivations of individuals to follow the norms. This issue is examined in the context of small-number norms and large-number norms.
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- Author Meets Critics: Cristina Bicchieri's The Grammar of Society
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
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