Hostname: page-component-5cf477f64f-n7lw4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-07T18:35:00.878Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The No-Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Greg Frost-Arnold
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 1 , January 2010 , pp. 35 - 58
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

I must thank Dennis Pozega, Laura Ruetsche, Feisal ben Hassel, Todd Jones, and Karen Frost-Arnold, as well as audiences at Seton Hall, University of Nevada at Las Vegas, and the 2008 PSA, who all helped to improve this article. The anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science also provided extremely useful insights.

References

Achinstein, P. (2002), “Is There a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism?”, Is There a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism? 99:470–495.Google Scholar
Barrett, J. (2003), “Are Our Best Theories (Probably and/or Approximately) True?”, Are Our Best Theories (Probably and/or Approximately) True? 70:1206–1218.Google Scholar
Boyd, R. (1980), “Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology,” in Asquith, Peter D. and Giere, Ronald N. (eds.), PSA 1980: Proceedings of the 1980 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 613–662.Google Scholar
Boyd, R. (1989), “What Realism Implies and What It Does Not”, What Realism Implies and What It Does Not 43:5–29.Google Scholar
Callender, C. (2004), “Is There a Puzzle about the Low Entropy Past?”, in Hitchcock, C. (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell, Chapter 12.Google Scholar
Caspar, M. ([1950] 1959), Johannes Kepler. Translated by Hellman, C. D.. London: Abelard-Schuman.Google Scholar
Cosmides, L. (1989), “The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason?”, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason? 31:187–276.Google ScholarPubMed
Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (1995), “Beyond Intuition and Instinct Blindness: Toward an Evolutionarily Rigorous Cognitive Science,” in Mehler, J. and Franck, S. (eds.), Cognition on Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 69–105.Google Scholar
Doppelt, G. (2005), “Empirical Success or Explanatory Success? What Does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain?”, Empirical Success or Explanatory Success? What Does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain? 72:1078–1087.Google Scholar
Driesch, H. (1899), “Die Lokalisation morphogenetischer Vorgänge—ein Beweis vitalischen Geschehens”, Die Lokalisation morphogenetischer Vorgänge—ein Beweis vitalischen Geschehens 8:35–111.Google Scholar
Driesch, H. (1929), The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. 2nd ed. London: Black.Google Scholar
Fine, A. (1986), “Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science”, Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science 95:149–179.Google Scholar
Fine, A. (1991), “Piecemeal Realism”, Piecemeal Realism 61:79–96.Google Scholar
Forster, M. (2007), “A Philosopher's Guide to Empirical Success”, A Philosopher's Guide to Empirical Success 74:588–600.Google Scholar
Gould, S. (1978), “Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling”, Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling 80 (1129): 530–533..Google Scholar
Gould, S., and Lewontin, R. (1978), “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme”, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme 205:581–598.Google Scholar
Harker, D. (2008), “Explaining Past Successes in Virtue of and Despite Particular Theoretical Commitments”, paper presented at the PSA 2008 meeting.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Hsu, S., and Zee, A. (2006), “Message in the Sky”, Message in the Sky 21:1495–1500.Google Scholar
Jennings, H. (1912), “Driesch's Vitalism and Experimental Indeterminism”, Driesch's Vitalism and Experimental Indeterminism 36:434–435.Google ScholarPubMed
Kepler, J. ([1596] 1981), Mysterium Cosmographicum. Translated by Duncan, A. M.. New York: Abaris.Google Scholar
Kitcher, P. (1981), “Explanatory Unification”, Explanatory Unification 48:507–531.Google Scholar
Kitcher, P. (2001), “Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy”, Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy 110:151–197.Google Scholar
Leplin, J. (1997), A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lipton, Peter (1991), Inference to the Best Explanation. New York: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lloyd, E. (1999), “Evolutionary Psychology: The Burdens of Proof”, Evolutionary Psychology: The Burdens of Proof 14:211–233.Google Scholar
Magnus, P. D., and Callender, C. (2004), “Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy”, Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy 71:320–338.Google Scholar
McMullin, E. (1994), “Enlarging the Known World”, in Hilgevoord, J. (ed.), Physics and Our View of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Miller, David (1974), “Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude”, Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude 25:166–177.Google Scholar
Morrison, M. (1990), “Unification, Realism, and Inference”, Unification, Realism, and Inference 41:305–332.Google Scholar
Psillos, S. (1999), Scientific Realism. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. (1975), Mathematics, Matter, and Method. vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Roux, W. (1912), Terminologie der Entwicklungsmechanik der Tiere und Pflanzen. Leipzig: Engelmann.Google Scholar
Sander, K. (1992), “Hans Driesch's ‘Philosophy Really Ab Ovo,’ or Why to Be a Vitalist”, Hans Driesch's ‘Philosophy Really Ab Ovo,’ or Why to Be a Vitalist 202:1–3.Google ScholarPubMed
Sander, K. (1993), “Entelechy and the Ontogenetic Machine—Work and Views of Hans Driesch from 1895 to 1910”, Entelechy and the Ontogenetic Machine—Work and Views of Hans Driesch from 1895 to 1910 202:67–69.Google Scholar
Sterelny, K., and Griffiths, P. (1999), Sex and Death. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stotz, K., Griffiths, P., and Knight, R. (2004), “How Scientists Conceptualize Genes: An Empirical Study”, How Scientists Conceptualize Genes: An Empirical Study 35:647–683.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, B. (1980), The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, B. (1989), Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Worrall, J. (1989), “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”, Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? 43:99–124.Google Scholar