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A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Susanna Rinard
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Abstract

The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black nonravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while nonblack nonravens and black nonravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than the kind black. The solution applies to any generalization “All F’s are G” in which F is more natural than G.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 81 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Many thanks to Mark Crimmins, Adam Elga, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Andrew Graham, Alan Hajek, Ned Hall, Agustin Rayo, Robert Stalnaker, Michael Strevens, Roger White, Stephen Yablo, three anonymous reviewers for Philosophy of Science, and an audience at the 2007 MITing of the Minds conference, Cambridge, MA. Special thanks to Miriam Schoenfield for detailed comments on multiple drafts. I am also very grateful to Vann McGee for answering some technical questions.

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