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The Natural Selection Model of Conceptual Evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Robert J. Richards
Robert J. Richards*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , September 1977 , pp. 494 - 501
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am indebted to William Wimsatt for his several critical remarks and advice concerning the arguments of this paper and to Donald Campbell for his generous encouragement.

References

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