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Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patricia Kitcher
Patricia Kitcher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota
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Abstract

Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tries to reduce confusion in computational psychology by dismissing some putative tasks as impossible. Block argues that the widespread faith in functionalism is just not warranted. I argue that all these critiques are misguided because they depend on holding cognitive psychology to taxonomic standards that other sciences routinely rise above.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 1985 , pp. 78 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to Ned Block, Philip Kitcher, Hilary Kornblith, and Joe Owens for helpful conversations, and to the M.I.T. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy for its hospitality during a valuable sabbatical visit. The helpful criticisms of two referees for Philosophy of Science enabled me to make a number of improvements in an earlier version.

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