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Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Karen Merikangas Darling
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Abstract

This paper addresses a central interpretive problem in understanding Pierre Duhem's philosophy of science. The problem arises because there is textual support for both realist and antirealist readings of his work. I argue that his realist and antirealist claims are different. For Duhem, scientific reasoning leads straight to antirealism. But intuition (reasons of the heart) motivates, without justifying, a kind of realism. I develop this idea to suggest a motivational realist interpretation of Duhem's philosophy.

Type
History of Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 1125 - 1136
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to express my gratitude to Arthur Fine for his helpful comments and editorial advice. Thanks also to Mathias Frisch for his criticisms of an earlier draft.

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