Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Advances in molecular biology have generally been taken to support the claim that biology is reducible to chemistry. I argue against that claim by looking in detail at a number of central results from molecular biology and showing that none of them supports reduction because (1) their basic predicates have multiple realizations, (2) their chemical realization is context-sensitive and (3) their explanations often presuppose biological facts rather than eliminate them. I then consider the heuristic and confirmational implications of irreducibility and argue that purely biochemical approaches are likely to be unsound and to be unable to confirm an important range of statements. I conclude by sketching criteria for scientific unity that do not entail reducibility and yet leave an important place for identifying underlying mechanisms. Molecular biology, properly understood, provides an excellent paradigm of non-reductive unity between different explanatory levels.
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the American Society for Cell Biology, December 1986. Karl Matlin made extensive comments on earlier drafts as well as contributing substantially to the basic arguments presented here through conversations over many years. Robin Lessel and a referee for this journal made helpful comments. Work on this paper was supported by a fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies.