Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T21:22:52.277Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Model for the Science of Decision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

James Bates
James Bates*
Affiliation:
Military Operations Research Division Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

This paper attempts to present a formal model for the science of decision where “science of decision” is restricted to the work that has been done in formal models and not those aspects connected with the gathering of empirical data and development of measures for the data. One of the difficulties in treating such a phenomenon as decision-making has been to give a precise statement of the problem. The literature of numerous fields is filled with models and talk about models where various restrictions are imposed. Among all of these it seems that the formalistic or logical, game-theoretic, and statistical decision function conceptual schemas have solved some decision problems largely due to the fact that they could give a mathematical formulation of the problem and its solution. The result is that in these three fields the decision problem can be fed into a computer which grinds out an answer for each particular set of parameters.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 21 , Issue 4 , October 1954 , pp. 326 - 339
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1954

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

I wish to thank G. A. Korn of Military Operations Research Division of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for his encouragement and criticism in the development of this paper. Of course, he is not to be held responsible for the concepts presented.

References

1. Ackoff, R. L. and Churchman, C. W., “An Experimental Definition of Personality” Philosophy of Science. Volume 14 (1947), pp. 304–332.Google Scholar
2. Bentham, J., The Theory of Morals and Legislation. G. Bell and Sons, 1893.Google Scholar
3. Dewey, J., Theory of Valuation. Encyclopedia of the Unified Sciences, Volume II No. 3. University of Chicago Press, 1939.Google Scholar
4. Gödel, K., “Über formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I” Monatshefte fur Mathematik und Physik. Volume 38 (1931), pp. 173–192.Google Scholar
5. Hilbert, D., “Über die Grundlagen der Logik und der Arithmetik.” Verhandlungen des Dritten Internationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses in Heidelberg vom 8 bis 13 August 1904, pp. 174–185.Google Scholar
6. Neumann, J. von, “Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele” Mathematische Annalen. Volume 100 (1928), pp. 295–320.Google Scholar
7. Neumann, J. von and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, 1947.Google Scholar
8. Neyman, J. and Pearson, E. S., “On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical Hypotheses” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Volume 231 (1933), pp. 289–337.Google Scholar
9. Singer, E. A., Experience and Reflection. (In preparation)Google Scholar
10. Smith, N. M., Walters, S. S., Brooks, F. C., and Blackwell, D. H., “The Theory of Value and the Science of Decision—A Summary” Journal of the Operations Research Society of America. Volume 1 (1953), pp. 103–113.Google Scholar
11. Wald, A., Principles of Statistical Inference. University of Notre Dame Press, 1940.Google Scholar
12. Wald, A., Statistical Decision Functions. J. Wiley and Sons, 1950.Google Scholar