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Milne's Argument for the Log-Ratio Measure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Franz Huber
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Abstract

This article shows that a slight variation of the argument in Milne 1996 yields the log-likelihood ratio l rather than the log-ratio measure r as “the one true measure of confirmation.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 75 , Issue 4 , October 2008 , pp. 413 - 420
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am grateful to Jiji Zhang for pointing out an error in a previous version of this paper, and to Branden Fitelson, Chris Hitchcock, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. My research was supported by the Ahmanson Foundation and the German Research Foundation through its Emmy Noether Program.

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