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Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Judson Webb
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Abstract

The metamathematical theorems of Gödel and Church are frequently applied to the philosophy of mind, typically as rational evidence against mechanism. Using methods of Post and Smullyan, these results are presented as purely mathematical theorems and various such applications are discussed critically. In particular, J. Lucas's use of Gödel's theorem to distinguish between conscious and unconscious beings is refuted, while more generally, attempts to extract philosophy from metamathematics are shown to involve only dramatizations of the constructivity problem in foundations. More specifically, philosophical extrapolations from metamathematics are shown to involve premature extensions of Church's thesis.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , June 1968 , pp. 156 - 178
Copyright
Copyright © 1968 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank my teacher Dr. Raymond Nelson for encouragement and many helpful discussions on the topics treated. He is, of course, not thereby responsible for my errors.

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