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Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind: A Rejoinder

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

J. R. Lucas
J. R. Lucas*
Affiliation:
Merton College, Oxford University
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 38 , Issue 2 , June 1971 , pp. 310 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Goodstein, R., “The Significance of Incompleteness Theorems,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 14, 1963, pp. 208–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Locke, John., Essay Concerning Human Understanding.Google Scholar
[3] Lucas, J. R., “Minds, Machines and Godei,” Philosophy, vol. XXXVI, 1961, pp. 112–127; reprinted in The Modeling of Mind (eds., Kenneth N. Sayre and Frederick J. Crosson), Notre Dame, 1963, pp. 255-271; and in Minds and Machines (ed., Alan Ross Anderson), Englewood Cliffs, 1964, pp. 43-59.Google Scholar
[4] Lucas, J. R., “True,” Philosophy, vol. XLIV, 1969, pp. 175–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Lucas, J. R., The Freedom of the Will, Oxford, 1970.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6] Webb, J., “Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 35, 1968, pp. 156–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar