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The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume's Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Gerhard Schurz
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Abstract

This article suggests a ‘best alternative’ justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 75 , Issue 3 , July 2008 , pp. 278 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

For valuable help I am indebted to Ronald Ortner, Eckhart Arnold, Markus Werning, Brian Skyrms, Nicholas Rescher, and an anonymous referee.

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