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Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John Bickle
John Bickle*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Mississippi
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Trenton State College, Hillwood Lakes CN–4700, Trenton, NJ 08650-4700, USA.
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Abstract

Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists should revise some significant details of the program, particularly the conception of theories, to circumvent this more potent Davidson-inspired worry.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 2 , June 1992 , pp. 217 - 230
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1992

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Footnotes

†

An earlier draft of this essay was presented at the Mid-South Philosophy Conference in April 1990. I thank participants for helpful comments and discussion. Special thanks are extended to Brad Petrie, who commented on the paper at the conference, and to David Henderson and Terence Horgan, who offered written comments on the earlier draft.

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