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Measure Theoretic Analysis of Consistency of the Principal Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Miklós Rédei  and
Zalán Gyenis
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Abstract

Weak and strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle are defined in terms of classical probability measure spaces. It is proved that the Abstract Principal Principle is both weakly and strongly consistent. The Abstract Principal Principle is strengthened by adding a stability requirement to it. Weak and strong consistency of the resulting Stable Abstract Principal Principle are defined. It is shown that the Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent. Strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle remains an open question.

Type
The Principal Principle
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 83 , Issue 5 , December 2016 , pp. 972 - 987
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Research was supported in part by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office, Hungary, K 115593 and K 100715. Rédei thanks the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, with which he was affiliated as honorary research fellow while this article was written.

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