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Logicism Lite
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
Logicism Lite counts number-theoretical laws as logical for the same sort of reason for which physical laws are counted as as empirical: because of the character of the data they are responsible to. In the case of number theory these are the data verifying or falsifying the simplest equations, which Logicism Lite counts as true or false depending on the logical validity or invalidity of first-order argument forms in which no numbertheoretical notation appears.
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References
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