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The Logic of Explanatory Power
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
This article introduces and defends a probabilistic measure of the explanatory power that a particular explanans has over its explanandum. To this end, we propose several intuitive, formal conditions of adequacy for an account of explanatory power. Then, we show that these conditions are uniquely satisfied by one particular probabilistic function. We proceed to strengthen the case for this measure of explanatory power by proving several theorems, all of which show that this measure neatly corresponds to our explanatory intuitions. Finally, we briefly describe some promising future projects inspired by our account.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
For helpful correspondence on earlier versions of this article, we would like to thank David Atkinson, Vincenzo Crupi, John Earman, Theo Kuipers, Edouard Machery, John Norton, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Tomoji Shogenji, audiences at PROGIC 09 (Groningen), the ESF Workshop (Woudschouten), and FEW 2010 (Konstanz), and especially Stephan Hartmann. Jan Sprenger would like to thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, which supported his work on this article with Veni grant 016.104.079. Jonah N. Schupbach would like to thank Tilburg University's Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, which supported him with a research fellowship during the time that he worked on this article.
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