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The Logic of Discovery

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Kevin T. Kelly
Kevin T. Kelly*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Carnegie-Mellon University
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Abstract

There is renewed interest in the logic of discovery as well as in the position that there is no reason for philosophers to bother with it. This essay shows that the traditional, philosophical arguments for the latter position are bankrupt. Moreover, no interesting defense of the philosophical irrelevance or impossibility of the logic of discovery can be formulated or defended in isolation from computation-theoretic considerations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 3 , September 1987 , pp. 435 - 452
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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