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Kuhn, Scheffler, and Objectivity in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Jack W. Meiland*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan

Extract

In his valuable book [3], Israel Scheffler presents an extended critique of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science. Scheffler argues against Kuhn's “main thesis,” namely that “... paradigm change in science is not generally subject to deliberation and critical assessment” ([3], p. 89). Scheffler does recognize, though, that there are important elements of Kuhn's view that themselves seem to conflict with this “main thesis.” For these elements seem to make possible deliberation, critical assessment, and objectivity in the discussion of scientific paradigms. So it appears from Scheffler's critique that Kuhn's position is inconsistent. The puzzle is compounded by Kuhn's admission—indeed, insistence—that his book does contain “a preliminary codification of good reasons for theory choice. These are ... reasons of exactly the kind standard in philosophy of science: accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like” ([1], p. 231). In his recent reply to (and further critique of) Kuhn, Scheffler quotes this passage from Kuhn and says: “If these reasons are not ... to be construed as utterly free of all constraints or themselves paradigm-dependent, then they allow the comparison of rival paradigms and make paradigm debates intelligible. Such intelligibility is, however, at odds with Kuhn's statement that the proponents of competing paradigms ‘will inevitably talk through each other’” ([4], p. 369). In this interchange between Scheffler and Kuhn, one gets the impression of people, if not paradigms, talking “through each other.” I think that this nonmeeting of minds is due to interpreting Kuhn as an opponent of objectivity when in fact he is not an opponent but a proponent. It is this misinterpretation which produces the apparent inconsistency in Kuhn's position. In this paper I suggest a way of understanding Kuhn which resolves this apparent inconsistency in his work and might help to focus discussion on the real issue between Kuhn and many of his critics. This suggestion has the crucial consequence of shifting the focus from objectivity to the real issue, namely truth.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Kuhn, T.Reflections on my Critics.” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Edited by Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.Google Scholar
[2] Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.Google Scholar
[3] Scheffler, I. Science and Subjectivity. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.Google Scholar
[4] Scheffler, I.Vision and Revolution: A Postscript on Kuhn.” Philosophy of Science 39 (1972): 366374.10.1086/288456CrossRefGoogle Scholar