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Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stephen P. Stich  and
Richard E. Nisbett
Stephen P. Stich
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
Richard E. Nisbett
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Abstract

This essay grows out of the conviction that recent work by psychologists studying human reasoning has important implications for a broad range of philosophical issues. To illustrate our thesis we focus on Nelson Goodman's elegant and influential attempt to “dissolve” the problem of induction. In the first section of the paper we sketch Goodman's account of what it is for a rule of inference to be justified. We then marshal empirical evidence indicating that, on Goodman's account of justification, patently invalid inferential rules turn out to be “justified.” We conclude that something is seriously wrong with Goodman's story about justification. In the second section we attempt to patch Goodman's account. The notion of epistemic authority and the social aspect of justification play central roles in the alternative account of justification that we propose.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 2 , June 1980 , pp. 188 - 202
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1980

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