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Is there a Synthetic a Priori?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Wilfrid Sellars
Wilfrid Sellars*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Extract

A survey of the literature on the problem of the synthetic a priori soon reveals that the term “analytic” is used in a narrower and a broader sense. In the narrower sense, a proposition is analytic if it is either a truth of logic or is logically true. By saying of a proposition that it is logically true, I mean, roughly, and with an eye on the problem of the relation of logical categories to natural languages, that when defined terms are replaced by their definientia, it becomes a substitution instance of a truth of logic. And a truth of logic can be adequately characterized for present purposes as a proposition which occurs in the body of Principia Mathematica, or which would properly occur in a vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage of this already monumental work. If we now agree to extend the convenient phrase “logically true” to cover truths of logic as well as propositions which are logically true in the sense just defined, we can say that an analytic proposition in the narrower sense is a proposition which is logically true.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , April 1953 , pp. 121 - 138
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1953

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Footnotes

∗

A revision of a paper read in a symposium on the Synthetic a priori at the Bryn Mawr Meeting of the American Philosophical Association December 1951.

References

1 Unless I am much mistaken, C. I. Lewis thinks of his ‘categorial principles’ as unquestionably analytic, because he thinks of them as analogous to “The area of a Euclidean triangle is ½ bh.” Now, if he intends this analogy, then his categorial principles are indeed logically true. But then, if the above discussion is sound, must there not be a corresponding set of propositions which are not logically true, and which contain a set of predicates which are not explicitly defined in terms of these propositions? predicates which correspond to “triangle” as occurring in Euclidean axioms, rather than to “Euclidean triangle?”

2 Let me make it clear from the beginning that my willingness to use the phrase “real or extra-linguistic meaning” in building up the dialectical structure of my argument does not reflect an acceptance on my part of a Platonic or Meinongian metaphysics of meaning. My purpose in this paper is to explore the controversy over the synthetic a priori sympathetically and from within, in the conviction that the truth of the matter lies separated from itself in the opposing camps. Some light will be thrown on the status of “real meanings” by the discussion of “‘Ø’ means Ø” in section 8 below.

3 See footnote 2 above.

4 It should not be assumed that in calling an event a symbol we are describing the event. We are rather serving notice that our discussion of the event will be in semantical terms.

5 Let me hasten to add that I am aiming this criticism at those uses of the phrase “semantical rule” only which evoke this phrase, as above, to explain the acquisition of extra-linguistic meaning by linguistic expressions. The phrase “semantical rule” may well have legitimate application elsewhere. I must confess, however, that I have yet to find in the literature of semantics (pure or applied) a “semantical rule” which is genuinely a rule.

6 For a defense of the thesis, presupposed in this paragraph, that statements of the form “‘…’ means– –” convey, but do not assert, information about the habits of language users with respect to ‘…’, see my “Mind, Meaning and Behavior”, Philosophical Studies, 3, 1952; also “Inference and Meaning,” Mind, 1953.

7 To say that Jones conforms to certain rules in his use of ‘with’ is not to say that Jones has certain habits with respect to ‘with;’ nor is either of these to say that as used by Jones ‘with’ means and. ‘Descriptive discourse,’ ‘discourse about rules’ and ‘discourse about meaning’ are three distinct ‘modes of speech.’ Nevertheless, by virtue of what is presupposed by their correct utterance, statements in one of these modes may convey information properly formulated in another mode.

8 The fact that such a statement as “‘red’ means red” conveys descriptive information about ‘red’ but does not describe it, undercuts the traditional problem of universals (and abstract entities generally). If one misunderstands the function of such statements, and suppose that “‘red’ means red” describes ‘red’ as standing in a relation to red, then, if one is anti-Platonist, one will be reluctant to use the semantical mode of speech and will be particularly unwilling to allow an inference from “‘red’ means red” to “There is a quality which ‘red’ means.” Statements of the latter kind appear to make bold assertion of the factual existence of abstract entities which are suspected to infect the former. The truth of the matter is that the “There is a quality (relation, possibility, particular)…” of the latter is a purely logical device which has no connection with “factual existence.” To say “There is an obligation more stringent than promise-keeping” is not to attribute “factual existence” to obligations!

9 By attacking this dogma of contemporary empiricism, I do not wish to be taken to assert that a meaningful language must contain primitive descriptive predicates which are not observation predicates. As far as I can see the issue involved is, in an important sense, a factual one; one which cannot be settled by the epistemologist. If the positivist thinks that all the factual predicates of empirical science can be explicitly defined in terms of sense-predicates, it is up to him to show this by doing it, not by appealing to a principle of empiricism.

10 A more detailed statement and defense of this thesis will be found in my paper on “Inference and Meaning” Mind, 1953.

11 For a brief account of the implications of the above interpretation of the causal modalities with respect to the nature and rationality of induction, see my paper on “Particulars,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 13, 1952, pp. 194 ff.