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Is the World Really “Dappled”? A Response to Cartwright's Charge against “Cross-Wise Reduction”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

Nancy Cartwright's charge against horizontal reductionism leads to a claim about how the world is, namely “dappled.” By proposing a simple thought-experiment, I show that Cartwright's division of the world into “nomological” machines and “messy” systems for which no law applies is meaningless. The thought-experiment shows that for a system, having the property of being a nomological machine depends on what kind of questions you ask about it. No metaphysical conclusion about the world being unruly or not can be drawn from a division that is question-dependent. Moreover, I argue that this predicament undermines Cartwright's attempt to provide an illustration of how bad metaphysics of science translates into bad scientific methodologies and policies.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

I would like to thank Philip Kitcher for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

References

Cartwright, Nancy (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cartwright, Nancy (1999), The Dappled World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cartwright, Nancy (2001), “Against the Completability of Science”, in Stone, M.W. F. and Wolff, J. (eds.), The Proper Ambition of Science. Routledge, 209222.Google Scholar