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Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (or: In Defense of “Narrow” Functions)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David J. Buller
David J. Buller*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA.
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Abstract

Millikan (1993) and Wilson (1994) argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 74 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

For thoughtful input on beta versions of this paper (not all of which I could incorporate while respecting word limits), I would like to thank Justin D'Arms, Valerie Hardcastle, Ruth Millikan, Elliott Sober, two anonymous referees, and an audience at Northwestern University (especially Arthur Fine, Christopher Horvath, David Hull, and Lenny Moss).

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