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Indeterminism and Epistemic Relativization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Wesley C. Salmon
Wesley C. Salmon*
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
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Abstract

Carl G. Hempel's doctrine of essential epistemic relativization of inductive-statistical explanation seems to entail the unintelligibility of the notion of objective homogeneity of reference classes. This discussion note explores the question of whether, as a consequence, essential epistemic relativization also entails the unintelligibility of the doctrine of indeterminism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , June 1977 , pp. 199 - 202
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I should like to express my gratitude to the National Science Foundation for support of research on scientific explanation.

References

REFERENCES

Hempel, C. G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: The Free Press, 1965.Google Scholar
Salmon, W. C., et al. Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.10.2307/j.ctt6wrd9pCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, W. C. “Comments on ‘Hempel's Ambiguity’ by J. A. Coffa.” Synthese 28 (1974): 165–169.10.1007/BF00485233CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, W. C. “Objectively Homogeneous Reference Classes.” Synthese 35, forthcoming.Google Scholar