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Incentivizing Replication Is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
Philosophers of science and metascientists alike typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit maximization. In this article I argue that this modeling assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative implication of this is that science policy should not focus solely on incentive reform.
- Type
- Social Epistemology and Science Policy
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
Footnotes
The author would like to acknowledge the audience of an online workshop on the replicability crisis organized by Olivier Leclerc and Stéphanie Ruphy, as well as Stijn Conix, Remco Heesen, and Liam Kofi Bright for their helpful comments.
References
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