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Imperatives, Logic, and Moral Obligation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Robert G. Turnbull
Robert G. Turnbull*
Affiliation:
State University of Iowa
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Abstract

It is claimed that 'Do x!“ means 'Then you will do x'. Answering a “Why?” question concerning the former may take either of two forms, viz., 'Because ——' or 'If you wish to ——'. The second answer completes the truncated hypothetical. “Ought” sentences are treated as a species of imperatives involving universality in the “if” clause ('If anyone wished to ——'). Moral “ought” sentences involve a double universality, viz., the one mentioned above and universality connecting the action with social harmony (e.g., “If everyone were to do x, then there would be social harmony').

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 27 , Issue 4 , October 1960 , pp. 374 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © 1959 by Philosophy of Science Association

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