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How Anti-Humeans Can Embrace a Thermodynamic Reduction of Time’s Causal Arrow

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Eli I. Lichtenstein
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Abstract

Some argue that time’s causal arrow is grounded in an underlying thermodynamic asymmetry. Often, this is tied to Humean skepticism that causes produce their effects, in any robust sense of ‘produce’. Conversely, those who advocate stronger notions of natural necessity often reject thermodynamic reductions of time’s causal arrow. Against these traditional pairings, I argue that ‘reduction-plus-production’ is coherent. Reductionists looking to invoke robust production can insist that there are metaphysical constraints on the signs of objects’ velocities in any state, given other—including far later—states’ properties. The Past Hypothesis may thus be a metaphysical condition, not a physical law.

Type
Physical and Mathematical Sciences
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 1161 - 1171
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Footnotes

†

Earlier versions of this article were presented in 2019 at an International Association for the Philosophy of Time meeting in Boulder and Society for the Metaphysics of Science meeting in Toronto—thanks to organizers and audiences. For helpful feedback, I am especially grateful to David Albert, Gordon Belot, Harjit Bhogal, Craig Callender, John Carroll, Nina Emery, Alison Fernandes, Tyler Hildebrand, Ezra Rubenstein, and Michael Tooley.

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