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Generalized Learning and Conditional Expectation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Simon M. Huttegger  and
Michael Nielsen
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Abstract

Reflection and martingale principles are central to models of rational learning. They can be justified in a variety of ways. In what follows we study martingale and reflection principles in the context of measure theory. We give special attention to two approaches for justifying these principles that have not been studied in that context before: diachronic coherence and the value of information. Together with an extant argument based on expected accuracy, these arguments lend support to the thesis that reflection and martingale principles govern rational learning.

Type
Formal Epistemology and Game Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 87 , Issue 5: PSA 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II Symposia Papers , December 2020 , pp. 868 - 883
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We would like to thank audiences at the PSA 2018, at Caltech, and at the University of Groningen for helpful discussions.

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