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The Function of Boundary Conditions in the Physical Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Julia R. S. Bursten
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Abstract

Early philosophical accounts of explanation mistook the function of boundary conditions for that of contingent facts. I diagnose where this misunderstanding arose and establish that it persists. I disambiguate between two uses of the term “boundary conditions”? and argue that boundary conditions are explanatory via their roles as components of models. Using case studies from fluid mechanics and the physics of waves, I articulate four explanatory functions for boundary conditions in physics: specifying the scope of a model, enabling stable descriptions of phenomena in a model, generating descriptions of novel phenomena, and connecting models from differing theoretical backgrounds.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 2 , April 2021 , pp. 234 - 257
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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