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Friedman, Galileo, and Reciprocal Iteration
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
In Dynamics of Reason, Michael Friedman uses the example of Galilean rectilinear inertia to support his defense of scientific rationality against postpositivist skepticism. However, Friedman's treatment of the case is flawed, such that his model of scientific change fails to fit the historical evidence. I present the case of Galileo, showing how it supports Friedman's view of scientific knowledge but undermines his view of scientific change. I then suggest reciprocal iteration as an amendment of Friedman's view that better accounts for scientific change.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
This article was greatly improved by discussions with Andrew Janiak. Tad Schmaltz, Mary Domski, Maarten van Dyck, Barbara Sattler, and Zvi Biener provided helpful comments. Thanks are also owed to audiences in Las Vegas, Durham, Cincinnati, Johnson City, Montreal, and Boston. All errors are the author's.
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