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A Framework for Pragmatic Reliability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Isaac Davis
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Abstract

I propose a framework for pragmatic reliability in-the-limit criteria, extending the epistemic reliability framework. I identify some common scientific contexts that complicate the application or interpretation of epistemic reliability criteria, drawing heavily from economics for illustrative examples. I then propose an extension of the standard framework, where inquiry is constrained by both epistemic and nonepistemic factors. This provides analogous notions of pragmatic underdetermination and pragmatic reliability with respect to a particular goal, as well as a principled method for extracting solvable problems from unsolvable ones.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 87 , Issue 4 , October 2020 , pp. 704 - 726
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am very grateful to David Danks and Kevin Kelly and the referees to this journal for their helpful feedback on previous drafts of this work.

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