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Fit, Finite, and Universal Axiomatization of Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Herbert A. Simon
Herbert A. Simon*
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
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Extract

In a previous paper (Simon and Groen 1973) it was proposed that theories of empirical phenomena should satisfy conditions of finite and irrevocable testability (FITness conditions). Roughly speaking, a theory is finitely testable if, for every set of observations that falsifies the theory, there exists a finite subset of observations that falsifies it. A theory is irrevocably testable if, for any finite set of observations that falsifies the theory, any superset of observations that includes that set also falsifies it—a theory falsified by observations cannot be resuscitated by adding new observations to the original set.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , June 1979 , pp. 295 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1979

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Footnotes

†

This research was supported by Research Grant MH-07722 from the National Institute of Mental Research and by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Office of the Secretary to Defense F44620-73-C-0074 which is monitored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. I am grateful to R. Duncan Luce for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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