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Explanatory Depth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Brad Weslake
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Abstract

I defend an account of explanatory depth according to which explanations in the nonfundamental sciences can be deeper than explanations in fundamental physics.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 273 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, Melbourne, July 6–11, 2008, and Models and Simulations 3, University of Virginia, March 6–8, 2009, where I received especially useful comments from Marshall Abrams, Mark Bedau, and John Humphreys. I am also grateful to Alisa Bokulich for helpful correspondence on this topic and to Jeff Glick, Kevin McCain, Chris Pincock, Nandi Theunissen, Jonathan Vogel, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions.

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