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[Explanation] Is Explanation Better

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Valerie Gray Hardcastle*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, College of Arts and Sciences, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061–0126.
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Abstract

Robert Wilson (1994) maintains that many interesting and fundamental aspects of psychology are non-individualistic because large chunks of psychology depend upon organisms being deeply embedded in some environment. I disagree and present one version of narrow content that allows enough reference to the environment to meet any wide challenge. I argue that most psychologists are already this sort of narrow content theorist and that these narrow content explanations of psychological phenomena meet Wilson's criteria for being a good explanation better than any wide explanation of the same event.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 154 - 160
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Millikan, R. (1984), Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Walker, V. (1990), “In Defense of a Different Taxonomy: A Reply to Owens”, The Philosophical Review XCIX: 425–431.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, R. (1994), “Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and Individualism in Psychology”, Philosophy of Science 61: 55–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar