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Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Kenny Easwaran
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Abstract

Expected accuracy arguments have been used by several authors (Leitgeb and Pettigrew and Greaves and Wallace) to support the diachronic principle of conditionalization, in updates where there are only finitely many possible propositions to learn. I show that these arguments can be extended to infinite cases, giving an argument not just for conditionalization but also for principles known as ‘conglomerability’ and ‘reflection’. This shows that the expected accuracy approach is stronger than has been realized. I also argue that we should be careful to distinguish diachronic update principles from related synchronic principles for conditional probability.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 1 , January 2013 , pp. 119 - 142
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank the Coalition of Los Angeles Philosophers, audiences at the math department at the University of Southern California and the philosophy department at the University of Konstanz, Richard Pettigrew, and an anonymous referee for this journal, for their helpful comments.

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