Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T14:38:04.388Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Evolutionary and Neuroscience Approaches to the Study of Cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Warren Schmaus
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

There is a need to bring the work of philosophers such as Millikan who take an evolutionary approach to the study of the mind more in harmony with work in the cognitive neurosciences. Studies of the brain suggest that knowledge in the cortex may be organized by sensory modality-specific properties rather than by hierarchies of substance concepts, regardless of how adaptive Millikan argues the latter would be. Ryder's work on SINBAD networks, which purports to support Millikan's conclusions, does not decide this issue. The ability to make cross-modal identifications of individuals and kinds may be only a recent evolutionary adaptation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 675 - 686
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

In preparing the final draft of this paper, I have been in e-mail correspondence with Ruth Millikan and Dan Ryder. I would like to thank them for their assistance. Of course, all interpretations, opinions, and errors are solely my own responsibility.

References

Atran, Scott (1989), “Basic Conceptual Domains”, Basic Conceptual Domains 4:7–16.Google Scholar
Boyer, Pascal (1998), “If ‘Tracking’ Is Category-Specific a ‘Common Structure’ May Be Redundant”, If ‘Tracking’ Is Category-Specific a ‘Common Structure’ May Be Redundant 21:67–68.Google Scholar
Caramazza, Alfonso (2000), “The Organization of Conceptual Knowledge in the Brain”, in Gazzaniga, Michael S. (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1037–1046.Google Scholar
Carey, Susan (1985), Conceptual Change in Childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Favorov, Oleg, and Ryder, Dan (2004), “SINBAD: A Neocortical Mechanism for Discovering Environmental Variables and Regularities Hidden in Sensory Input”, SINBAD: A Neocortical Mechanism for Discovering Environmental Variables and Regularities Hidden in Sensory Input 90:191–202.Google ScholarPubMed
Gallistel, Charles, Brown, A., Carey, Susan, Gelman, R., and Keil, Frank (1993), “Lessons from Animal Learning for the Study of Cognitive Development”, in Carey, Susan and Gelman, Rochel (eds.), The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 3–36.Google Scholar
Gelman, Susan A., and Coley, J. D. (1991), “Language and Categorization: The Acquisition of Natural Kind Terms”, in Gelman, Susan A. and Byrnes, James P. (eds.), Perspectives on Language and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 146–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodale, Melvyn A. (2000), “Perception and Action in the Human Visual System”, in Gazzaniga, Michael (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 365–377.Google Scholar
Goodale, Melvyn A., Jakobson, Lorna S., and Servos, Philip (1996), “The Visual Pathways Mediating Perception and Prehension”, in Gazzaniga, Michael (ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience: A Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 106–123.Google Scholar
Gopnik, Alison, and Meltzoff, Andrew (1996), Words, Thoughts, and Theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Güzeldere, Güven, Flanagan, Owen, and Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2000), “The Nature and Function of Consciousness: Lessons from Blindsight”, in Gazzaniga, Michael (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1277–1284.Google Scholar
Hart, John Jr., Berndt, Rita Sloan, and Caramazza, Alfonso (1985), “Category-Specific Naming Deficit Following Cerebral Infarction”, in Gazzaniga, Michael (ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience: A Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 406–410.Google Scholar
Kaas, Jon H. (1989), “Why Does the Brain Have So Many Visual Areas?”, in Gazzaniga, Michael (ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience: A Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 448–472.Google Scholar
Keil, Frank C. (1979), Semantic and Conceptual Development: An Ontological Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keil, Frank C. (1989), Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Markman, Ellen M. (1989), Categorization and Naming in Children. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Marler, Peter (1993), “The Instinct to Learn”, in Carey, Susan and Gelman, Rochel (eds.), The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 37–66.Google Scholar
Martin, Alex, Ungeleider, Leslie G., and Haxby, James V. (2000), “Category Specificity and the Brain: The Sensory/Motor Model of Semantic Representation of Objects”, in Gazzaniga, Michael (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1023–1036.Google Scholar
Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1998a), “A Common Structure for Concepts of Individuals, Stuffs, and Real Kinds: More Mama, More Milk, and More Mouse”, A Common Structure for Concepts of Individuals, Stuffs, and Real Kinds: More Mama, More Milk, and More Mouse 21:55–65.Google Scholar
Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1998b), “Words, Concepts, and Entities: With Enemies Like These, I Don’t Need Friends”, Words, Concepts, and Entities: With Enemies Like These, I Don’t Need Friends 21:89–100.Google Scholar
Millikan, Ruth Garrett (2000), On Clear and Confused Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, Ruth Garrett (2006), Varieties of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Minsky, Marvin (1975), “A Framework for Representing Knowledge”, in Winston, Patrick Henry (ed.), The Psychology of Computer Vision. New York: McGraw-Hill, 211–277.Google Scholar
Ryder, Dan (2004), “SINBAD Neurosemantics: A Theory of Mental Representation”, SINBAD Neurosemantics: A Theory of Mental Representation 19:211–240.Google Scholar
Ryder, Dan (2006), “On Thinking of Kinds: A Neuroscientific Perspective”, in Macdonald, Graham and Papineau, David (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schank, Roger C. (1975), “The Primitive Acts of Conceptual Dependency”, Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing, workshop in Cambridge, MA, June 10–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spelke, Elizabeth S. (1989), “The Origins of Physical Knowledge”, in Weiskrantz, Lawrence (ed.), Thought without Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 185–210.Google Scholar
Spelke, Elizabeth S. (1993), “Physical Knowledge in Infancy”, in Carey, Susan and Gelman, Rochel (eds.), The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 133–170.Google Scholar
Xu, F., and Carey, Susan (1996), “Infant Metaphysics: The Case of Numerical Identity”, Infant Metaphysics: The Case of Numerical Identity 30:111–153.Google ScholarPubMed